This paper analyzes the eects of the Great Recession on dierent generations. While older generations have suered the largest decline in wealth due to the collapse in asset prices, younger generations have suered the largest decline in labor income. Potentially, the young may benet from the purchase of cheaper assets, especially if they have access to credit. To analyze the impact of these channels, I construct an overlapping generations model with borrowing constraints in which households choose a portfolio over housing as well as risk-free and risky nancial assets. Shocks to labor eciency and uncertainty regarding the return on risky assets generate a recession with a drop in asset prices and cross-sectional changes in consumption, investment, and wealth that are consistent with the recent recession. In particular, younger generations experience large declines in nondurable consumption and housing investment, a fact that is supported by the data. Overall, the young suer the largest welfare losses, equivalent to a 5 percent reduction in lifetime consumption.
Introduction
The Great Recession of [2007] [2008] [2009] has been one of the largest contractions in the United States since the Great Depression. However, the recession has not impacted all households equally. On the one hand, older generations have suered the largest decline in wealth due to the collapse in asset prices. Glover et al. (2011) estimate that the average American household whose household head is between 60 and 69 years of age experienced a decline in wealth of $310,000, while the average household between 20 and 29 years of age experienced a $30,000 decline in wealth. On the other hand, younger generations have suered the largest decline in labor income. Potentially, the young may benet from the purchase of cheaper assets, osetting this drop in labor income. The eects of these large changes in labor income and asset prices in the Great Recession may have lasting eects on the welfare of households beyond the duration of the recession. This paper evaluates the joint impacts of these channels on lifetime welfare.
Much of the recent literature on generational welfare over the Great Recession has focused on labor outcomes that emphasize the high unemployment suered by the young generation (see for example Bell and Blanchower (2010) ; Elsby et al. (2010) ). Others such as Pynoos and Liebig (2009) have focused on the collapse in asset prices and its eect on retirement savings. Glover et al. (2011) analyze the joint eects of asset prices and labor income on lifetime welfare. Using a general equilibrium overlapping generations model, they nd that old generations suer the largest decline in welfare, equivalent to a 10 percent decline in lifetime consumption, while younger generations are welfare-neutral, largely because of their ability to take advantage of depressed asset prices. However, I document that, as of 2009, young households have less housing and less securities, in real terms, compared to 2007. Hence, it seems that many young households are not able to take full advantage of the cheaper assets. Motivated by this empirical evidence, this paper modies and extends Glover et al. (2011) by investigating the role of borrowing constraints in household ability to nance asset purchases. Another important feature of the data is that there is great variation in household debt-to-asset ratios both across and within age cohorts. While the average debt-to-asset ratio of young households is only 34 percent, 14 percent of young households have debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 100 percent. This suggests that modeling within-age heterogeneity is essential for understanding the role of borrowing constraints.
I construct an overlapping generations model with borrowing constraints in which households choose a portfolio over risk-free and risky assets. Households are heterogeneous in portfolio, income, and wealth both across and within age cohorts. The calibrated model ts the data very well along important dimensions such as wealth prole and risky asset prole by household age, as well as population wealth distribution. Shocks to labor income and uncertainty regarding the return on risky assets generate a recession with a drop in asset prices and cross-sectional changes in consumption, investment, and wealth that are consistent with the recent recession. In particular, younger generations experience large declines in nondurable consumption and housing investment, a fact that is supported by the data.
Moreover, I show that the interaction between borrowing constraints and wealth heterogeneity plays a crucial role; although the average young household is not credit-constrained, a signicant fraction of young households are constrained, especially so during the recession.
Overall, I nd that the young suer the largest welfare losses, equivalent to a 5 percent reduction in lifetime consumption. Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1996) .
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents changes in consumption and asset positions over the recent recession, and the large heterogeneity in household leverage (debt-to-asset ratios) across and within age cohorts. Section 3 presents a model economy which is used to interpret the empirical ndings and to formally analyze the lifetime welfare implications of this recession. The calibration strategy is discussed in section 4. 1 Labor income is dened as the sum of wages, salaries, and two-thirds of self-employment income.
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Household consumption
In addition to suering the largest decline in labor income, young households experienced very large declines in nondurable consumption and durables expenditure. 
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Hence, it does not seem to be the case that the young are taking advantage of these cheaper assets. 
Heterogeneity across and within age cohorts
Households also vary to large degree in their the level of indebtedness. Table 4 reports the debt-to-asset ratios of households across age cohorts. To be more specic, the debt-toasset ratio reported for young households (20-44) is the total value of debt held by young households divided by the total value of assets held by young households. Heterogeneity of leverage within age cohorts is even greater. In particular, Table 5 reports some statistics summarizing the heterogeneity of household leverage within young households. It is worth noting that more than 14 percent of young households have negative net wealth, i.e. more debt than assets, even before the decline in asset prices. 
Households
There is a continuum of nitely lived households indexed by i. Households of age j ∈ {1, 2, .., J} face conditional survival probabilities given by {ψ j }. Newborns are endowed with {ω i } which is exogenous and time invariant. Population grows at rate g, and the aggregate measure of households is normalized to one. Preferences are given by
where c ij is consumption of nondurable goods, s ij is services of housing (and consumer durables) at age j, and β is the time discount factor. Note that the period utility function u j depends on age. This captures the change in consumption needs of dierent household 8 sizes along the life cycle.
6 Changes in household size are exogenously given. I assume that
s ij e j ) where e j is the number of adult equivalents in age j households, and u : R 2 + → R is increasing, strictly concave, and homothetic.
Portfolio choice
Households can choose a portfolio that consists of two risky assets and one risk-free asset.
The rst risky asset is housing, denoted by h. Housing h yields a ow of housing services s. 
where w is the wage rate, and τ is the labor income tax.
3.1.3
Household problem
Then the problem of the household of age j with wealth a and labor productivity shock z can be written recursively as:
9 Alternatively, one may use endogenous debt limits as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) , or explicit mortgage contracts as in Chambers et al. (2009) 10 As in Heathcote et al. (2010) and Iacoviello and Pavan (2009) , I assume that pension payments are uniform across households for computational tractability.
Since {j, a, z} are sucient to characterize household i, we can omit the dependence on i. The solution to this problem can be represented by age-dependent policy functions for nondurable consumption c jt (a, z), housing h jt (a, z), non-housing risky assets x jt (a, z), and risk-free bonds b jt (a, z).
Production
There is a representative rm that produces nondurable goods with a constant returns to scale technology given by
where A is productivity and L t is the rm's labor demand. Given the wage rate w, the rm's problem is to maximize prot, Y t − wL t .
The per capita stock of housing and stocks are assumed to be xed atH andX , respectively. I also assume that housing and non-housing risky assets can be traded only by domestic households. • prices {w t , p ht , p xt } t=0,..,∞ ,
• and distributions {µ jt (a, z)} j=1,..,J, t=0,..,∞ such that:
1. Given prices, the policy functions solve the problem of the households and the rms 2. Distribution of new born agents {µ 1t (·)} t is given, and is consistent with initial wealth endowments. Additional distributions are induced by policy functions and by transition functions for exogenous states 3. Markets clear:
Calibration
This section explains the calibration of the model. In sections 4.1-4.3, I discuss the parameters set outside of the model, followed by parameters that require solving for equilibrium allocations in section 4.4. I then show that the calibrated model matches the data along some important dimensions in section 4.5.
Demographics and Income
A period in the model is 5 years. Households enter the labor market at age 20 (model age j = 1), and retire at age 65 (j * = 9), and die by age 100 (J = 16). 14 Figure 1 depicts the net wealth of households, aged 16-24, and the initial wealth endowments used in the model. The age-specic component of labor income {η j } j=1,..,J is taken from household earnings from the CEX, while the idiosyncratic stochastic component z is assumed to follow an orderone autoregressive process as follows:
with the persistence parameter ρ Z set to 0.9, and variance parameter σ z set to 0. process is approximated with a three-state Markov process using the procedure described in Tauchen (1986) , and then adjusted to reect the ve year period of the model. The income tax rate τ is set to 8.4 percent so that it fully funds the retirement pension payment S which is set to 40 percent of the average wage in the economy. Figure 2 summarizes the key demographics and income parameters. 
Assets
The collateral constraint λ is set to 0.8 to be consistent with a 20 percent down payment requirement.
16 The annualized housing maintenance parameter δ h is set to 7 percent, which is computed from the depreciation rates of housing and durables, given by 2 and 19 percent, respectively.
17 The house shock ξ is assumed to be a two-state i.i.d. process with ξ H = 
Preferences
Household preferences are given by
where γ is the preference weight on housing services, and σ is the risk aversion parameter.
Following Glover et al. (2011) , I set σ = 3 for the baseline calibration, and present sensitivity results in the Appendix. The calibration of γ is discussed below.
Parameters Jointly Calibrated
The housing weight γ, dividend d, discount factor β, stock market participation cost f , and variance parameter of the non-housing assetζ are jointly calibrated to match ve moments:
the total value of housing risky assets, the total value non-housing risky assets, the leverage ratio 18 of young households, overall stock market participation, and the 95th-quantile-tomedian wealth ratio. 19 Figure 4 20 In the periods following the recession, it is assumed that the individual 19 One reason for this inability to generate extremely rich households lies in the nite state approximation of the shocks to income and risky assets.
20 The shock to labor income is modeled as a shift in the labor income distribution rather than an economywide drop in labor income. This is motivated by the fact that the drop in hours worked was much larger labor income processes follow the auto-regressive income process described in section 4. This implies that it takes many periods for aggregate income to fully recover, as can be seen in Figure 5 . Both the income drop and uncertainty shocks, i.e. mean-preserving spreads to the stochastic processes for risky assets, drive the asset price declines in the model. The rst channel is that as households have less income, their demand for both housing and nonhousing risky assets fall. The second channel is that the more uncertain an asset's return becomes, the less that asset is demanded. This lower demand leads to an equilibrium fall in asset prices. Using this channel, the uncertainty shocks are calibrated such that the model recession generates price declines of 20 percent for both housing and non-housing assets.
21
The actual decline in prices of housing and stocks range from 10 to 50 percent, depending on the data source and time length chosen. Sensitivity results for dierent price drops are presented in the Appendix. 21 Recent works have documented an increase in uncertainty regarding rm growth rates (see, for example, Arellano et al. (2011); Schaal (2010) ), and this suggests a potential way to identify the magnitude of the uncertainty shocks. asset prices, followed by a recovery over time, with non-housing risky asset prices recovering faster than housing prices. It is worth noting that non-housing asset prices are less sensitive than housing asset prices to movements in labor income. This is because, unlike housing assets, non-housing assets are held primarily by wealthy households who are less dependent on labor income. Since housing prices are more correlated with labor income, and since the shock to labor income has some persistence, the housing price falls on impact and takes some time to recover the pre-recession prices. However, as the non-housing risky asset price is less correlated with labor income, the non-housing price falls on impact, but recovers most of its value once the uncertainty has been resolved. Note that ve year periods imply that if 2003-2007 is interpreted as period t = −1, then the model predicts asset prices will have recovered most of the losses by model period t = 1, which would be 2013-2017. The welfare gains of the dierent generations are presented in Table 6 . The young generation suers the largest welfare losses, equivalent to a 5.4 percent decline in remaining lifetime consumption. Table 7 shows that the young also suer a large decline in nondurable consumption in the recession, similar in magnitude to the decline in nondurable consumption in the data. As can be seen in Table 8 , the young purchase less housing assets, as is consistent with the data, and they purchase more non-housing risky assets, but their net investment 19 in risky assets is negligible. The young are not able to take full advantage of cheaper assets because a signicant fraction of young households are credit-constrained in the model, especially so during the recession. The middle-aged generation, ages 45-64, suers the smallest welfare losses, equivalent to a 3.5 percent decline in remaining lifetime consumption. Although this cohort also suers a large reduction in nondurable consumption, they enjoy a larger ow of housing services, and more importantly, the larger housing investment results in higher expected consumption in future periods due to the realized capital gains on the housing asset. Hence, it is the middle-aged cohort that is able to take advantage of the cheaper assets. The old generation 20 also suers large welfare losses, albeit smaller than the young. They do enjoy larger housing, but suer a large decline in their overall risky asset investments, which decreases expected consumption in future periods. borrowing constraints, the old generation suers the largest welfare losses while the young generation suers the smallest welfare losses. This is because the young have the ability to oset part of their welfare losses from a large drop in labor income with the welfare gains of purchasing cheap risky assets.
Conclusion
This paper develops a model of the Great Recession that is consistent with the age wealth prole, the cross-sectional wealth distribution, changes in asset prices, and changes in labor income across age groups. I use this model to evaluate the welfare consequences for the dierent generations. The young suer the largest welfare losses, equivalent to a 5.4 percent decline in lifetime consumption. In the model, the young are unable to take full advantage of cheaper assets as many of them are credit-constrained, especially so during the recession.
The model predicts that the young suer large declines in nondurable consumption and housing/durables investment; these predictions are consistent with the data.
Although this paper focuses on the eects of this recession by age, there is another important dimension: leverage. The model predicts that highly leveraged households, i.e. households with very large amounts of debt relative to their assets, are more likely to suer large welfare losses because of their limited ability to smooth consumption over the recession and to invest in cheap assets due to a binding borrowing constraint. This result is related to recent empirical work by Mian and Su (2010) and Midrigan and Philippon (2011) who nd that US regions that experienced large increases in household leverage prior to the Great Recession were also regions that experienced large declines in output, employment, and durable consumption during the recession. As documented in Section 2, young households are typically more leveraged than older households. The fact that young households are highly leveraged at the onset of the Great Recession, coupled with the fact that the young suer the largest declines in labor income, induces the large welfare losses of the young.
These facts are consistent with Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) who document that 48% of households under age 50 are under nancial distress, compared to 16% for age above 64, where nancial distress is dened as an indicator for any of the following: unemployed, negative equity in house, behind more than two months on mortgage, in foreclosure.
Another important dimension is the potential long-term labor market consequences for young households. Kahn (2010) uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to nd large, negative, and persistent wage eects of graduating into a bad economy. This dimension of adverse long-term labor market consequences is also captured in the quantitative exercise presented in this paper. In the model, there is a larger fraction of low income households in the recession period, especially for the young, compared to non-recession periods. Due to the auto-regressive properties of the labor income process, the economy eventually returns to the pre-recession labor income distribution, but as shown in Figure 5 , the scars from the recession persist for many periods.
This paper abstracts from two dimensions that may have quantitative signicance. The rst is the rent-own margin. One may argue that young households who were renters at the start of the recession can potentially benet by becoming homeowners when housing prices are cheap. This channel may be signicant. However, in the data, home ownership for young households actually decreases from 51 percent in 2007 to 48 percent in 2009. The second is household expectations over aggregate shocks such as the declines in aggregate labor income and asset prices experienced in the Great Recession. If households form expectations that large aggregate shocks can happen, this would provide an additional precautionary saving motive for households. However, since the calibration strategy involves targeting the average debt-to-asset ratio of young households, the calibrated model with and without expectations over aggregate shocks would generate the same level of leverage. Still, it can be the case that the steady state fraction of households close to the borrowing constraint could be smaller.
